Trump’s Russian ties and the fractured transatlantic relationship

The Trump-Putin relationship is forcing NATO and the EU to shift from a competitive relationship to a strategic, collaborative mindset, writes Judy Dempsey

In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasions of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union have both been forced to reassess their fundamental strategic roles as guardians of Europe as they explore collaborative responses to the crisis. 

The real catalyst for this strategic shift is the actions of US President Donald Trump, rather than those of Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

Trump has shaken Europe, challenging its long-held belief that the US would always provide a protective umbrella.

During his first term as US President, Trump criticised NATO’s European allies for underspending on defence, underscoring a perceived inequity in burden-sharing within the alliance. 

Now, he has signalled his willingness to consider withdrawing the US from NATO altogether, questioning the reliability of Article 5, which commits the military alliance to defending any member country under attack. 

Not anymore, Trump says—if they have not spent enough on their security. Weakened US support for NATO, or a complete exit from the alliance, would leave the EU vulnerable.  

The decades-long transatlantic relationship would be dangerously undermined—a goal of successive Russian leaders. 

Trump is doing Putin’s bidding by putting Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity on the negotiating table. In doing so, the US President has ignored how Russia has repeatedly broken the ceasefire Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed to in March. 

With this major shift in American foreign policy, NATO and the EU, including neutral countries such as Austria and Ireland, must move fast in several ways. 

First, the Europeans cannot wait for Trump to weaken his commitment to the alliance. Major NATO and EU countries—Britain, France, Germany and Poland—need to form coalitions of the willing to prepare for an eventual withdrawal of the US from NATO. 

NATO’s European ‘caucus’ needs to be strengthened, military capabilities assessed and the expenditure required to compensate for a potential US exit assessed. That won’t be easy, and it will be costly.

Second, the EU Commission wants member states to embrace serious defence ambitions, another costly task, requiring time and clear communication with voters. 

In the meantime, there is no reason the EU and NATO cannot share capabilities under the special “Berlin Plus” arrangements, giving the EU access to NATO assets and planning capabilities if the alliance is not militarily involved. Such a partnership could serve as a foundation for an EU-led coalition of the willing for Ukraine.

Third, in light of the ongoing conflict, it’s crucial for the EU and NATO to increase their military, economic and political support for Ukraine. 

NATO’s European members could take over from the US leadership of the Ramstein forum, known as the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. Established in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine, its 50 countries provide military support to Ukraine. 

Finally, Germany and other countries are discussing Europe’s nuclear powers with France and the UK. This would have been unthinkable a few months ago, demonstrating just how much Trump’s relationship with Putin is upending the transatlantic relationship.

Judy Dempsey is Nonresident Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe

*Disclaimer: The views expressed in this column published in the April/May 2025 issue of Accountancy Ireland are the author’s own. The views of contributors to Accountancy Ireland may differ from official Institute policies and do not reflect the views of Chartered Accountants Ireland, its Council, its committees or the editor.