Western perceptions of Central and Eastern Europe are shifting, sparking far-reaching change inside NATO and the EU. Judy Dempsey explains why
The European Union is changing, and so is NATO. While these changes may not be immediately discernable, they will have repercussions for EU policies, not just in relation to Ukraine and Eastern Europe, but also Russia.
And they will have a lasting impact on NATO, as it focuses increasingly on defending the Baltic States and other Central European members.
Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine is the catalyst for these shifts, which have several aspects, not least those rooted in the historical and political differences between Western and Central Europe.
The Soviet totalitarian system was imposed across Eastern and Central Europe after 1945, while their Western counterparts benefited from reconstruction efforts under the Marshall Plan.
Western Europe built this part of the continent on the foundations of prosperity, democracy and a peace project embodied by the European Steel and Coal Community, the precursor to the EU.
It wasn’t until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, that Central Europe came back to Europe. The dream of a Europe “united and free” was finally realised, in theory at least.
And herein lies the basis for another shift brought home by the war in Ukraine. Central Europe has never trusted Russia’s intentions, whether in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, or Ukraine.
They warned their Western European counterparts about the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, how Germany’s dependence on Russian gas would give the Kremlin a geostrategic weapon to divide Europe, and how Russia’s first invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2014 would not stop there.
All the while, several West European countries played down such fears, even suggesting that the Central European attitude towards Russia was outdated and just plain anti-Russia. It was time to move on.
Poland and the Baltic States can now confidently say “we told you so” following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine invasion, his use of energy to threaten other countries and his ambitions to prevent Ukraine and other countries in the region from pursuing a democratic, pro-European path.
These shifts are having an impact inside both the EU and NATO. Successive French and German leaders who forged very close ties to the Kremlin have had to change their perception of Russia’s trajectory.
Since 1989, these two countries have viewed Eastern Europe through the prism of Russia, as if neither was a truly independent sovereign state.
This perception has finally faded as Berlin and Paris now see the defense of Ukraine as being vital to European security—and vital for Ukraine’s survival as an independent, sovereign country.
This has strengthened the backbone of the EU in terms of sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.
Perceptions of Central Europe have also been essential to NATO’s new emphasis on Northern Europe.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has persuaded Finland and Sweden to join NATO—a move that strengthens the alliance, but also halts, for the moment, the EU’s ambitions for strategic autonomy.
The war in Ukraine has exposed the EU’s lack of common security and defense culture, which explains why the Central Europeans have become even more “Atlanticist” as they seek to bolster the defense of Europe.
Their next task—their biggest policy shift—will be working out how to integrate Ukraine and Eastern Europe into the EU and NATO. And that’s a whole other chapter.
Judy Dempsey is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and Editor-in-Chief of Strategic Europe