The heavy cost of defeat

Wavering over support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia is not an option. The stakes are too high for Europe’s stability and unity, writes Judy Dempsey

Russia’s war against Ukraine is approaching its tenth month. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s original aim of conquering Ukraine within days after his 24 February invasion, Russian troops have been forced to withdraw from strategic areas in eastern Ukraine. 

It’s too difficult to speculate how and when this war will end, but there is already a sense of war fatigue among some governments and political parties in Europe and the United States—ignoring the fact that Russia has been escalating this war over the past few months and Ukraine must continue to fight for its independence. There is even some suggestion that Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky should be persuaded to negotiate with Putin. 

This would be a mistake. 

Understandably, several EU countries—especially the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—do not trust Putin’s intentions. They want Ukraine to continue regaining occupied territory and then negotiate from a position of strength. This kind of victory for Ukraine would have several outcomes for the region and the EU.

A Ukrainian victory could deter Russia from spreading its military and political influence in Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Such a victory would be a fillip to pro-European political movements in these countries. 

As for Belarus, there is little chance that the political future of Alexander Lukashenka, who has imprisoned many Belarussians since their failed uprising over two years ago and repressed any kind of opposition, would survive.  

A Ukrainian defeat, on the other hand, could encourage the Kremlin to extend its influence over Eastern Europe and consolidate Lukashenka’s regime which would, in the short-term, increase his grip on power. In the long term, this ‘stability’ based on repression would lead to instability. 

In short, a victory by Ukraine could increase the stability of Eastern Europe. A Russian victory would lead to instability in the region.

As for the EU, a return to Russia exerting its political and economic influence over Eastern Europe would have several consequences. 

First, it would lead to new divisions on the European continent. 

Second, as many EU countries have taken in Ukrainians, an unstable Eastern Europe would lead to new flows of refugees. Populist movements could exploit such a development. 

Third, it would lead to deeper divisions inside the EU. The Central European countries would oppose any negotiations that would allow Putin to save face. Germany and France might be tempted to restore relations with the Kremlin—indeed, neither Berlin nor Paris have called unambiguously for Ukraine to win this war. 

Fourth, given these differences, it is hard to see how the EU could ever agree to a strong and united foreign, security and defence policy. Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed the level of distrust between the Central European and big EU member states.
Small EU countries matter. Perhaps, for example, Ireland, Finland and Denmark, could form coalitions of the willing with the Central Europeans to maintain political, military and economic support for Ukraine. 

Wavering over support for Ukraine is not an option. The stakes are too high for Europe’s stability and unity.